Timeline of Events

Del Monte begins growing pineapple on the plantation in the 1940s. Fumigants, such as ethylene dibromide (EDB), 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP) and 1,2-dichloropropane (DCP) were used from the early 1940s until 1983 to control nematodes that infest the pineapple root.

The idea for the “Kunia Tunnel” came after the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Fear of a repeat-attack prompted the Army and Navy to plan a less vulnerable, under-ground complex, designed as an aircraft assembly and repair plant. The storage facility envisioned within the “tunnel” was said to be capable of handling B-17 heavy bombers. Called “The Hole” by locals, this huge complex was built in the pineapple fields south of Wheeler Field and Schofield Barracks. Construction on the 23 million dollar under-ground tunnel complex began in 1942, and was completed in late 1944. The facility is not a true tunnel, but a free-standing three-story structure that was later covered with earth. The facility was constructed as an open bay area, without interior cement blocks. The outer walls are composed of reinforced concrete and dirt. It is approximately 250,000 square feet in overall size, with 30,000 square feet used for power generation and air conditioning. The remaining 220,000 square feet were available for assembly of folded winged aircraft.

The Facility (lat/long: 21.475898 -158.053429) was located beneath the 6,000 acres Del Monte Plantation, bordering upon Schofield Barracks and walking distance from Wheeler Army Airfield.

Access to the structure was by means of a quarter mile-long tunnel, at the end of which were elevators for the different levels. Two elevators serviced the field station — one capable of accommodating four 2 1/2-ton trucks or “an average size four-room cottage”. For passenger service, another elevator was provided with a carrying capacity of 20 persons. It even had a cafeteria that could turn out 6,000 meals a day. Huge air conditioning and ventilating systems ensured a constant flow of fresh air drawn from the open countryside. Some idea of the size of the building may be gained from the fact that it took almost 5,000 forty-inch fluorescent tubes to light the facility. There is no historical evidence to suggest the field station was ever used for aircraft assembly. During the last stages of the World War II, the 30th Base Engineering Battalion used the tunnel for topographic work involving Japanese held islands. At the end of WWII, the tunnel facility was turned over to the Air Force.

The tunnel facility was kept in a reserve status until 1953, at which time the Navy assumed control and used it for ammunition and torpedo storage. According to an article published in the Honolulu Star Bulletin, the Navy announced on June 28, 1953, it would convert the bunker into a secret facility. A local construction team was awarded the contract for $1.7 million to revamp the facilities. When the initial renovations were completed in the early 1960s, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces, used the complex as a command center. In 1966, the facility was hardened against chemical, biological and radiological attacks. In 1976, the Fleet operations center was moved to another location and the tunnel was turned over to the General Services Agency for disposition.

Source: History of NIOC Hawaii

In 1975, the Del Monte pineapple plantation on O`ahu made a fateful change in its management of soil fumigants. Until that time, the plantation had purchased the fumigants — used to control root nematodes — in metal drums, typically containing 50 or 55 gallons. In 1975, though, it began purchasing the primary fumigant it used, ethylene dibromide (EDB), in bulk shipments, which were stored in a 25,000-gallon tank hard by a drinking-water well at Kunia.

Two years later, on April 7, 1977, the danger inherent in the new approach burst into full view. The flexible hose on the bulk container of EDB broke when Del Monte began to empty the EDB into its holding tank. According to a letter dated April 12, 1977, from the plantation superintendent, N.E. Blomberg, to the Hawai`i sales representative for Dow Chemical Co., manufacturer of EDB, the break was not noticed immediately: “Since this is a closed system of transfer and takes approximately one hour to empty no one stands by during this time. About five minutes after we started the emptying process the break was noted by our shop personnel who immediately shut the valve.”

Blomberg calculated that, of the 2,648 gallons of EDB in the full container, 191 had been transferred into Del Monte’s tank and 1,962 remained in the bulk shipping container when the leak was discovered. Unaccounted for were 495 gallons, which had either soaked into the ground or evaporated, according to Blomberg.

The area of the spill “is near our domestic water well,” Blomberg informed Dow. The well, only about 50 feet away from the spill site, supplied drinking water to more than 600 residents at Kunia Camp. “From the way the well is constructed we do not believe any contamination took place,” he said — while adding that he believed Dow had taken water samples for analysis.

In light of all that has transpired in the intervening years, as a direct consequence of that spill, Blomberg’s worry over the cost of the lost fumigant takes on the dimensions of legendary superficiality. Did he have a distant cousin who fussed over the arrangement of the Titanic’s deck chairs?

Last month marked the 41st anniversary of that spill, whose impact is still being felt in the loss to O`ahu of a once productive drinking water source, in the cost required to treat water systems downslope of the spill area, and in the cost to Del Monte of undertaking a cleanup of the site in accordance with federal Superfund requirements.

And those costs, running into the tens of millions of dollars, are merely the easily measured ones. The toll on human health is far more difficult to assess scientifically, although theoretically, it is more than likely that harm has been or will be done — that someone has contracted a cancer as a result of the spill, or that an infant was born with a genetic defect. For EDB is a dangerous chemical that the Environmental Protection Agency has determined to be carcinogenic (cancer-causing) and mutagenic (causing genetic defects).

The outcome of the tests, if any, that Blomberg believed Dow to have made is not reported in any of the files maintained by the state Department of Health. The DOH did its own sampling of the well on April 15, 1977, but determined that EDB was not present in the water at a level above the test’s limit of detection. (At 500 parts per trillion, the limit of detection was crude by today’s standards. In fact, the present maximum contaminant level for EDB in drinking water is 40 parts per trillion, or less than a tenth of the level of EDB required to trigger a positive reading in the 1977 test.)

The well was tested again in June 1979, but only for the presence of another soil fumigant, dibromochloropropane, or DBCP. According to a “Data Summary and Evaluation Report for the Del Monte … Superfund Site” prepared for the Environmental Protection Agency by ICF Technology, Inc., in April 1995 (the ICF report), “the results indicated DBCP was present at the detection limit (0.4 micrograms per liter). A confirmatory sample collected by Del Monte on August 13, 1979, indicated the presence of DBCP at 0.3 mg/L (the detection limit had been lowered to 0.2 mg/L).”
Meanwhile, the well continued to supply drinking water to residents of the Kunia camp.

Source: Well Contamination at Del Monte: The Making of a Superfund Site

In April 1980, at the urging of the EPA, the state again undertook a systematic program of testing more than 60 wells in areas where soil fumigants had been applied on O`ahu and Maui. Test results from a sample taken on April 14 from the Kunia Camp well showed EDB present at 92 mg/liter — 2,300 times the .04 mg/L maximum EDB contaminant level that was then in effect.
(The microgram-per-liter ratio expresses parts per billion. Fractions of micrograms may also be expressed as nanograms, or parts per trillion. Thus, .04 mg/L equals 40 nanograms per liter, or ng/L. For purposes of comparison, a concentration of one part per billion is equal to one teaspoon of contaminant in a 2.5 million gallon water tank, much like many of those used by the Honolulu Board of Water Supply.)
On April 24, the Kunia well was retested. This time, the concentration of EDB stood at 300 mg/L, or 7,500 times the maximum contaminant level at the time.

In both samples, DBCP was found to be present at 11 mg/L, or 275 times the state maximum contaminant level set for that chemical.
The day following results from the second tests, the state Department of Health ordered Del Monte to stop using the well as a source of potable water for Kunia Camp.

A year following closure of the Kunia Camp well, Del Monte notified the Environmental Protection Agency of the spill and the discovery of what it described as “suspected chronic low-level spills of DBCP and EDB in the storage area … during mixing operations or transfer of these chemicals from storage drums to the supply truck.”

By 1984, the Kunia well was one of several O`ahu wells that the state of Hawai`i had proposed to the EPA for consideration as possible Superfund sites, under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, better known as the Superfund law). The other wells had become contaminated through the routine and legal use of pesticides. Under the interpretation of Reagan administration officials, this source of contamination made the wells ineligible for cleanup under the Superfund protocols. Only the Kunia well could be shown to have been contaminated by a spill; for this reason, it alone among the contaminated O`ahu wells became the subject of further investigation by the EPA.
For the next 10 years, the EPA’s investigation continued. Among other things, Del Monte disclosed to the EPA that in 1980, it buried 43.5 pounds of methyl bromide in a field adjoining the plantation’s northern boundary with the Army’s Schofield Barracks installation. It disclosed also that before 1980, it had buried empty drums used for fumigant storage at 22 different sites, of which 17 could be located.

In September 1990, Ecology and Environment, Inc., submitted to the EPA its preliminary site inspection report. In 1992, the EPA completed a hazard ranking process, and on May 7, 1993, the EPA announced it was proposing to add the Del Monte plantation to the roster of sites on its National Priorities List (Superfund). Following a comment period (during which time objections to the listing were made to the EPA by Hawai`i’s senior senator, Daniel K. Inouye), the site was formally added to the Superfund list on December 16, 1994.At the urging of the EPA, the state again undertook a systematic program of testing more than 60 wells in areas where soil fumigants had been applied on O`ahu and Maui. Test results from a sample taken on April 14 from the Kunia Camp well showed EDB present at 92 mg/liter — 2,300 times the .04 mg/L maximum EDB contaminant level that was then in effect.

In 1981, 2,000 tons of contaminated soil were removed from the Del Monte Kunia EDB spill area. Later that year, hydrologist, John Mink identifies existence of a high-level perched aquifer that began 20 to 30 feet below the surface of the ground and extended downward to about 150 feet below the surface. As part of his analysis of the extent of contamination, Mink began testing the water in the perched aquifer. At one well near the pesticide storage and mixing area, the initial concentration of EDB was about 200,000 parts per billion, while DBCP was pegged at 500 ppb. At a nearby well, EDB concentrations were slightly lower (50,000 ppb), but levels of DBCP were higher — initially, 15,000 ppb, with a peak reading of nearly 3 million ppb DBCP (2,964,000 ppb, for a concentration of almost 3 tenths of a percent).

Del Monte fitted the three perched-aquifer wells with 10-gallon-per-minute pumps, which it ran several hours each day in an effort to remove contaminated water. Though, these pumps were initially thought to have helped reduce contamination levels – a later report completed by ICF Technology, Inc indicated otherwise. Rather than the shallow wells aiding in the site clean-up, the ICF report suggests that their drilling and pumping may have actually contributed to contamination of the basal aquifer. “The perched wells were located in the areas containing the highest concentrations of soil fumigants … [and] may have potentially contributed to the vertical migration of EDB and 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP).”

In describing contamination of one of the perched-water wells, in fact, ICF suggests it acted as a drain for water accumulating in the excavated pit. “Due to the location of Well 9X at the bottom of the excavation,” ICF states, “groundwater infiltrating into the pit and rainwater accumulating in the pit will likely migrate down the well casing.” The shallow wells were finally capped in late 1994 or early 1995.

Three shallow wells drilled as part of Mink’s study revealed another surprise: the existence of a high-level perched aquifer that began 20 to 30 feet below the surface of the ground and extended downward to about 150 feet below the surface. As part of his analysis of the extent of contamination, Mink began testing the water in the perched aquifer. At one well near the pesticide storage and mixing area, the initial concentration of EDB was about 200,000 parts per billion in February 1981, while DBCP was pegged at 500 ppb. At a nearby well, EDB concentrations were slightly lower (50,000 ppb), but levels of DBCP were higher — initially, 15,000 ppb, with a peak reading of nearly 3 million ppb DBCP (2,964,000 ppb, for a concentration of almost 3 tenths of a percent).

At a shallow well just 25 feet away from the deep (and contaminated) Kunia Camp basal well, EDB concentrations were far less — around 300 ppb, on average. Mink speculated that “most of the spill evaporated or was bio-degraded near the ground surface, but a small quantity reached the perched water.” An equally plausible explanation for the relatively low levels of EDB in the perched aquifer, however — and one supported by the high levels of EDB in the basal well — is that the EDB had long since gone to deeper levels.

In any event, in 1981, Del Monte fitted the three perched-aquifer wells with 10-gallon-per-minute pumps, which it ran several hours each day in an effort to remove contaminated water. By 1984, Mink reported significant drops in EDB levels: in one of the two wells near the mixing and storage area, EDB concentrations were down 86 percent (to 7,000 ppb) by the end of 1983, while in the other they fell 93 percent (to 15,000 ppb). In the area of the EDB spill, the perched water contamination went from 300 ppb to less than 50 ppb. According to reports made to the EPA, the pumped water was sprayed onto an unplanted field or was used for dust control.

Water from the deep basal well was also pumped out “every three or four days, from four to eight hours” a day, according to Mink, but the results were not nearly as dramatic. “At the start of pumping, the concentration of EDB has a median value of 2.3 ppb,” Mink wrote. “Four hours later the median falls to 0.7 ppb and remains at this value for the following four hours…. At the start of pumping the median value of DBCP is 2.6 ppb … After four hours, the median is 2.0 ppb, and it remains at this level another four hours later.”
According to E&E, the failure of the Kunia Camp well to show a “marked decrease of contaminant concentration over time … indicates that contamination of the deeper aquifer has occurred.”

Pumping of the perched wells was for the most part discontinued in 1983, but the Kunia deep-water well continued to be pumped until September 6, 1994, when the EPA informed Calvin Oda of Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawai`i), Inc., that the practice amounted to an unapproved treatment technology and constituted “an unlawful disposal of hazardous substances.” On receiving the notice, Oda replied, Del Monte immediately disconnected the Kunia Well from the “non-crop irrigation system and terminated all clean-up activities at the Kunia Well site until alternative treatment technologies can be developed and implemented.”

Rather than the shallow wells aiding in the site clean-up, the ICF report suggests that their drilling and pumping may have actually contributed to contamination of the basal aquifer. “The perched wells were located in the areas containing the highest concentrations of soil fumigants … [and] may have potentially contributed to the vertical migration of EDB and 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP).”
In describing contamination of one of the perched-water wells, in fact, ICF suggests it acted as a drain for water accumulating in the excavated pit. “Due to the location of Well 9X at the bottom of the excavation,” ICF states, “groundwater infiltrating into the pit and rainwater accumulating in the pit will likely migrate down the well casing.” The shallow wells were finally capped in late 1994 or early 1995.

For years, pesticide users and producers had claimed that the risk of chemicals such as EDB migrating to the water table was minimal. Most of the chemicals were thought to volatilize when exposed to sunlight. What remained was thought to bind tightly to the soil and degrade over time.
When tests of well water in California and Florida began to show evidence of EDB contamination, that belief began to be challenged. Locally, evidence of EDB’s relatively swift march to the groundwater was provided by John Mink, a hydrologist retained in 1980 by Del Monte to assess the extent of contamination resulting from the 1977 spill.

Shortly after beginning his work, Mink discovered a second “focus” of contaminants. A site inspection report prepared in 1990 for the Environmental Protection Agency by Ecology and Environment (the E&E report) summarizes Mink’s findings: “From the 1940s to 1975, drums of both EDB and DBCP were stored on bare ground on the slope of a small gully located approximately 50 to 150 feet north of the Kunia Camp well. It is likely that the release of contaminants from the storage area in the gully was systematic, resulting from poor housekeeping practices during the mixing, handling, and dispensing of soil fumigants stored in drums; this release may have occurred throughout the duration of the gully’s use as a storage location.”
The E&E report states: “Based on drilling techniques employed in 1947, it is believed that the annular space [the space between the well casing and drilled borehole] of the Kunia Camp well was left open, and that it may provide for the movement of contaminants from the perched aquifer zone to the deeper drinking water aquifer,” also known as the basal lens. “The most likely scenario,” the report continues, “based on the behavior of the ratio of contaminants in samples from the Kunia Camp well plotted against time, is that both the storage-area plume and the spill-area plume are drawn into the well as it is pumped.”

The ICF report in 1995 noted that when a down-hole video was made of the well in 1980, “groundwater seepage through the perforated casing above the water table was observed, and was interpreted as coming from the overlying saprolite aquifer. Due to the absence of grout in the well annulus, the well’s proximity to confirmed soils contamination, and the seepage observed in the video logs, the well is considered a potential conduit for contaminants to the basal aquifer.”

In other words, the presence of saturated soil at relatively shallow levels allowed the EDB plume to expand rapidly to the deep-water well shaft. From there, it had a straight shot into the basal aquifer. And the more the well was pumped, the more the EDB was injected into the primary source of drinking water on O`ahu — the Pearl Harbor aquifer.

In 1990, Schofield Barracks was placed on the EPAs National Priorities Listing with an EPA Hazard Ranking System score of 28.9. It is believed the Del Monte Kunia contaminations likely contributed to this issue, though the argument would be greatly contested for many years to come.

A ‘catastrophic flood’ occurred on 12 March 1991 within Field Station Kunia, resulting in further exacerbation of known contaminants. Thousands of gallons of water breached through the ceiling above the Battalions’ Main Operations Floor. Soldiers acted immediately to control the spread of rising waters, and participate in the clean up efforts – ultimately restoring the BN’s mission with minimal impact to National Security. Though, the Department of the Army issued awards for those assisting, they still did not provide a full disclosure of the contamination.

Shortly thereafter, soldiers reported large blistering sores, difficulty breathing, headaches and sleep disturbances. In the years to come, many would succumb to early aggressive cancers and failures of autonomic function and cardiovascular diseases.

EPA completes a hazard ranking process for Del Monte Plantation (Kunia) representing (EPA Hazard Ranking System score – 50). This score was based, in part, to contaminants discovered during rigorous testing.

The chemical substances (i.e., hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants) listed below were identified as contaminants of concern (COC) for the site. COCs are the chemical substances found at the site that the EPA has determined pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment. These are the substances that are addressed by cleanup actions at the site. Identifying COCs is a process where the EPA identifies people and ecological resources that could be exposed to contamination found at the site, determines the amount and type of contaminants present, and identifies the possible negative human health or ecological effects that could result from contact with the contaminants.

Soil samples from the sidewalls of the excavation found EDB concentrations ranging from 17.5 to 482 ppb, while DBCP was found at levels between 7.5 and 421 ppb. Soil samples from the same area made six months later found much lower concentrations of both chemicals. EDB was present at levels ranging from 18.6 to 27.8 ppb, while DBCP ranged from non-detectable levels to 67.2 ppb. More than a decade later, three soil samples were taken from the excavation pit. DBCP remained at a concentration of 67.2 ppb in one sample, while it was undetectable in the remaining two. EDB was detected in each of the samples, with concentrations ranging from 18.6 to 27.9 ppb.

The EPA has established what it calls preliminary remediation goals for EDB and DBCP, both of which are suspected cancer-causing agents. For residential soil, the preliminary remediation goal for EDB is 5.1 parts per billion; for DBCP, the figure is 320 ppb.

EPA informs Calvin Oda of Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawai`i), Inc., that the practice of pumping perched water amounted to an unapproved treatment technology and constituted “an unlawful disposal of hazardous substances.” On receiving the notice, Oda replied, Del Monte immediately disconnected the Kunia Well from the “non-crop irrigation system and terminated all clean-up activities at the Kunia Well site until alternative treatment technologies can be developed and implemented.”

Later that year, the Environmental Protection Agency identified the Kunia Well Site for potential listing on the National Priorities List (“NPL”) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended.

In December, 1994 the EPA issued a final rule adding the Kunia Well Site to the NPL (EPA ID #HID980637631; 94-1000 Kunia Road, Kunia, HI).

A report (GAO/NSIAD-95-8 Environmental Cleanup) was submitted by the GAO National Security and International Affairs Division to then Chairman of the Committee on Government Affairs (‘Environmental Cleanup – Case Studies of Six High Priority DOD Installations) indicating the existing risks to human health and the issues impeding their resolution. Schofield Barracks was included in this report.

Later that year, a 305,000-gallon concrete underground storage tank was removed from Field Station Kunia. During removal, it was discovered that there was an uncontrolled release of diesel. Some of the contaminated soil was removed. Initial investigations failed to properly delineate the full extent of the contamination.